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Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 5 (September, 1992), 1071-1096 
DENUMERABLE-ARMED BANDITS 
BY JEFFREY s. BANKS AND RANGARAJAN K. SUNDARAM 1 
This paper studies the class of denumerable-armed (i.e. finite- or countably infinite-
armed) bandit problems with independent arms and geometric discounting over an 
infinite horizon, in which each arm generates rewards according to one of a finite number 
of distributions, or "types." The number of types in the support of an arm, as also the 
types themselves, are allowed to vary across the arms. We derive certain continuity and 
curvature properties of the dynamic allocation (or Gittins) index of Gittins and Jones 
(1974), and provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the Gittins-Jones 
result identifying all optimal strategies for finite-armed bandits may be extended to 
infinite-armed bandits. We then establish our central result: at each point in time, the 
arm selected by an optimal strategy will, with strictly positive probability, remain an 
optimal selection forever. More specifically, for every such arm, there exists (at least) one 
type of that arm such that, when conditioned on that type being the arm's "true" type, 
the arm will survive forever and continuously with nonzero probability. When the reward 
distributions of an arm satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), the 
survival prospects of an arm improve when conditioned on types generating higher 
expected rewards; however, we show how this need not be the case in the absence of 
MLRP. Implications of these results are derived for the theories of job search and 
matching, as well as other applications of the bandit paradigm. 
KEYWORDS: Bandits, Gittins index, survival, monotone likelihood ratio property, sta-
tionary bandits, job search. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Tms PAPER STUDIES THE CLASS of denumerable-armed (i.e., finite- or countably 
infinite-armed) bandit problems with the characteristic that each arm available 
to the decision-maker generates rewards according to one of a finite number of 
densities, called the types of the arm. 2 The expected reward from each type of 
each arm is assumed to be defined and finite. The arms are assumed indepen-
dent: trying one arm is uninformative about the types of the other arms. Finally, 
it is assumed that discounting by the decision-maker is geometric over an 
infinite horizon. No other restrictions are employed. In particular, the forms of 
the reward densities and the number of types are allowed to be arbitrary and to 
1 This paper has benefited immeasurably from the detailed comments and suggestions offered by 
Andy McLennan as a (then anonymous) referee. We are also very grateful to Martin Hellwig and 
two other anonymous referees for their careful reading of earlier drafts and their suggestions; as 
also to seminar audiences at Buffalo, Caltech, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, George Mason, Harvard, 
Hoover Institution, McMaster, Michigan, Johns Hopkins, Rochester, Toronto, UCLA, UC-River-
side, Washington-St. Louis, Western Ontario, and Yale, for their input. In particular, we would like 
to thank Prajit Dutta, Mahmoud El-Gamal, Nicholas Kiefer, David Levine, and Bill Zame. The first 
author gratefully acknowledges financial support provided by the Sloan Foundation and the NSF. 
The final draft of this paper was completed when the second author was visiting the California 
Institute of Technology, and he would like to thank them for their hospitality. 
2 With transparent modifications, all of our results remain valid if, instead of reward densities, we 
had discrete reward distributions (i.e., those with finite or countable support). 
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1072 J. S. BANKS AND R. K. SUNDARAM 
vary across the arms, and the discount factor of the decision-maker is allowed to 
take on any value in [O, 1). 
It is well known that when the number of arms is finite, optimal strategies 
may be obtained through solving a family of stopping problems that associates 
with each arm an index, known as the dynamic allocation index (DAI), or the 
Gittins index, where this index depends only on the current belief on that arm's 
type.3 In Section 3 (Lemma 3.1), we characterize the stopping problem defining 
the DAI. The resulting properties of this problem enable us to show (Lemma 
3.2) that for each arm, the DAI is a continuous, quasi-convex function of the 
prior on the arm, which possesses in addition, a certain monotonicity property. 
These results, while of independent interest, prove valuable in the sequel. 
Section 4 addresses the existence issue in the context of infinite-armed 
bandits. In Theorem 4.l(i), we establish that strategies using the DAI once 
again uniquely identify the class of all optimal strategies. This enables us to 
provide (Theorem 4.l(ii)) necessary and sufficient conditions under which opti-
mal strategies exist. 
Section 5 turns to the main focus of this paper, the question of "survival." We 
examine here the stochastic process governing the continuous play of an arm 
under the optimal strategy. Our main result in this section is that at each point 
in time, the arm selected by the optimal strategy will remain an optimal 
selection forever with strictly positive probability. More specifically, Theorem 
5.1 shows that for each arm that becomes optimal at some point, there must 
exist a type in the support of that arm with the following property: if that type 
were in fact the true type of the arm (i.e., the type generating the observed 
rewards), then the arm would survive forever and continuously with nonzero 
probability as an optimal selection. 
A natural conjecture, in view of Theorem 5.1, is that if some type in the 
support of an arm survives forever with positive probability, all " better" types 
(i.e., those generating a higher expected reward) should also survive forever with 
nonzero probability. Somewhat surprisingly, this conjecture is false. Example 5.1 
illustrates this point. Each arm here may be one of the same three types. Under 
the optimal strategy, the best type fails in finite time with probability one, while 
the second-best type survives forever with probability one. 
We then turn to an examination of conditions under which the " negative" 
conclusion of Example 5.1 may be avoided. In Theorem 5.2, we show that if the 
reward distributions on an arm satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property 
(MLRP), then the probability of surviving at least t periods (for any positive 
integer t) is higher for better types in the support of that arm. In particular, the 
"best" type has the highest probability, and the "worst" type the lowest. As a 
corollary, it follows that if some type survives forever with positive probability, 
then all better types also survive forever with at least the same probability. 
3 See, e.g., Gittins and Jones (1974), Berry and Fristedt (1985), or Whittle (1982). Weitzman 
(1979) proves an analogous result for the "Pandora's box" (or "treasure hunt") problem, where the 
reward distributions are degenerate (implying the true type of an arm is known with certainty after 
one play of the arm). 
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Two remarks are in order at this point. First, at the risk of repetition, we wish 
to emphasize that none of our general results require any special structure on 
the reward densities or restrictions on the value of the discount factor (other 
than of course the MLRP assumption in Theorem 5.2). Second, the assumption 
of a finite number of types in the support of each arm is exploited in order to 
establish the quasi-convexity of the DAI in the prior. We are unclear on the 
extent to which this may be generalized. However, we note that a number of our 
results-for instance, the existence of optimal plans in infinite-armed bandits 
under suitable conditions, or the continuity of the DAI-do not depend on this 
finiteness restriction. 
A special case of our framework is a class of bandit problems that we label 
stationary bandits. A stationary bandit is an infinite-armed bandit in which all 
arms are a priori identical, namely, the set of possible types is the same across 
all arms, as is the prior belief concerning an arm's type. All our general results 
apply in toto to stationary bandits of course; but the additional structure here 
also enables a sharper characterization. In particular, (i) optimal strategies 
always exist in stationary bandits; (ii) optimal strategies exist which never recall 
a previously selected and discarded arm.; and (iii) the expected number of arms 
employed in an optimal strategy in a stationary bandit is finite, so that with 
probability 1 only a finite number of arms are ever used. 
The framework of stationary bandits has been a popular framework for the 
analysis of decision making in labor markets. The parameterized "matching" 
models of Jovanovic (1979), Wilde (1979), and Viscusi (1979) all have as their 
scenario a worker who periodically receives information concerning her current 
job's true but unobservable characteristics.4 In Jovanovic (1979), for instance, 
the productivity of the worker is job-specific, the worker's compensation in each 
period is her expected productivity, and the worker uses output observations to 
infer her true productivity with the current firm and thereby predict future 
wages from remaining with the current job. Moreover, all untried firms are 
ex ante identical. The resulting optimization problem can evidently be viewed as 
a stationary bandit, in which the jobs are the arms of the bandit, and the 
worker's true productivity on a particular job is the arm's true type.5 
The motivation for the current project was itself an alternative interpretation 
of the stationary bandit framework: as a median-voter model of repeated 
elections. Consider a single voter faced with a set of candidates from whom she 
elects one to be her political representative for the current period. The chosen 
representative (stochastically) generates per-period rewards for the voter as a 
function of some unobservable, candidate-specific parameters. The voter, 
4 Cf. Mortensen (1985) for an in-depth survey of these and other search models in labor 
economics. 
5 It is worth noting that many papers in labor economics impose the restriction that recall of a 
tried and discarded arm is not permissible, and while Jovanovic (1979), in his pioneering paper on 
job-matching, mentions that the "no-recall" result holds in his framework, his paper does not 
contain a proof. 
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through her ability to elect and observe candidates while in office, attempts to 
identify "good" candidates. Treating the candidates as the arms, and the 
candidate-specific parameters as the arms' true types, this forms a special case 
of the framework we study in this paper. It is worth noting that in contrast to 
most models of repeated elections (e.g., Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), or 
Austen-Smith and Banks (1989)) which study the voter's decision problem from 
a "moral hazard" perspective, the stationary bandit framework is a model of 
adverse selection. 
Several other economic (and noneconomic) problems are also amenable to 
being modeled in the bandit framework. For instance, an alternative labor 
market version of the stationary bandit model is obtained by treating the arms 
of the bandit as workers who differ in their productivity; and the decision-maker 
as a firm searching over these workers. As other examples, we mention general 
search problems involving nondurable experience goods, and models of dating 
and marriage. 
Finally, we briefly indicate the related theoretical literature. Three excellent 
summaries of results for finite-armed bandit problems are the monographs by 
Berry and Fristedt (1985), who provide an exhaustive analysis of bandits under 
general discount sequences; Gittins (1989), who discusses index theorems for 
bandits; and Pressman and Sonin (1990), who focus primarily on bandits with 
dependent arms. In addition, Basu, et al. (1990) provide a comprehensive survey 
of recent papers in this field. There is also an extensive literature on optimal 
Bayesian learning in economic environments, e.g., Rothschild (1974), Easley and 
Kiefer (1988), McLennan (1988), and Feldman (1989). A question of primary 
interest in the latter has been whether optimally-acting individuals will, in the 
limit, learn the "truth," i.e., the parameter values actually driving the model. 
Two interpretations of the learning ques·tion could be provided in the frame-
work we have adopted; but learning cannot occur with certainty in either case. 
First, one could view the unknown parameters as the vector describing the true 
type of each of the arms. The main result of Section 5 shows that with positive 
probability the very first arm employed will be used forever; hence with positive 
probability the decision-maker only learns the true type of a single arm, so that 
it cannot be the case that learning occurs in this sense with probability one. A 
second interpretation would be to consider only whether the decision-maker 
would be able to identify an arm of the "best" type in the limit. But Example 
5.1 which shows that, even in a stationary bandit, the best type may last only 
finitely long with probability one, demonstrates that "learning" in this weaker 
sense need not occur either. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the framework, and 
gathers notation and definitions. Section 3 introduces and characterizes the 
DAI. Section 4 is concerned with existence of optimal plans, while Section 5 
focuses on the question of "survival." Section 6 concludes with a description of 
some open questions and unresolved conjectures. Proofs of results that are 
omitted in the main body of the paper may be found in the Appendices. 
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2. THE FRAMEWORK 
The family of bandit problems we study has the following structure. There are 
N independent arms, where N ~ 2 is either a positive integer or oo. The set of 
all arms is denoted by in, with generic element i. Arm i may be one of a finite 
number K(i) of types. If the true type of arm i is k E {1, ... , K(i)}, then it 
generates rewards according to the density fl(·). Let R~ denote the corre-
sponding expected reward, i.e., R~ = frfl(r)dr. We assume, without loss of 
generality, that these rewards are ordered for each i in the sense that R{ ~ 
R~ ~ · · · ~ Rkci)· We also assume that 
(2.1) R* := suplR~I < oo. 
i,k 
We make no assumptions regarding common support of, or stochastic domi-
nance in the reward distributions arising from, the densities (fl}. 
In each period of an infinite horizon, a decision-maker (hereafter referred to 
as the principal) must decide on the choice of arm to be employed that period. 
However, the true type of some or all of the arms (and, hence, the true reward 
distribution associated with those arms) may be a priori unknown to the 
principal. The principal begins with a vector of prior beliefs P = (p(i))i e 91 , 
where6 p(i) E LlK(i)-l represents the principal's belief regarding the type distri-
bution of arm i, viz., the kth coordinate of p(i) is the principal's prior 
probability that the true type of arm i is k. 
The beliefs are updated using observed rewards as follows. Let P' = (p'(i)); e 91 
represent the principal's beliefs at the beginning of any period t, and suppose 
arm i is chosen that period and the reward r is witnessed. Then, by indepen-
dence, the reward r reveals no information about the true types of arm j =fa i, so 
that we have p 1+ 1(j) = p 1(j) for all j =fa i. For arm i the updated belief p 1+ 1(i) 
is given by the Bayes map f3i: LlK<i>- 1 X IR~ LlK<i>- 1• This map is defined by 
f3i(p'(i); r) = (f3ik(pt(i); r )k~1 •... K(i)' where 
/[ K(i) l (2.2) f3ik(p 1(i),r) =pk(i) ·fl(r) }:/J,.(i) -f~(r) 
if the quantity on the right-hand side is weil defined (i.e., the denominator is 
nonzero), and is arbitrary otherwise. 
A t history for the bandit is a description of the arm used in each period up 
to t and the corresponding rewards witnessed. Let H 1 be the set of all possible 
t histories. A strategy u for the principal is a specification of the arm to be 
played in any period as a function of the initial belief and the history up to that 
6 For any finite integer n, Lln-l will denote the positive unit simplex in ~n: 
Lln-l = { xE ~nix; ~O, and ~X;= 1 }· 
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period. Formally, u is a sequence of measurable maps {u1}~=o where u 0 E !n, 
and for t;;;. 1, u1 : H 1 ---) !n. Let ,! denote the set of all strategies. 
The principal discounts future rewards geometrically, using the discount 
factor 8E[O,1). Given the initial prior P, each strategy u defines in the obvious 
(if notationally complex) way an expected tth period reward r 1(u; P) for the 
principal. Hence, each strategy u also defines a total expected reward W(u; P) 
as 
00 
(2.3) W(u;P)= }28 1r1(u;P). 
t=O 
The principal's objective is to find a strategy u* such that W(u*; P);;;. W(u; P) 
for all u E .!. When such a strategy exists, it will be called an optimal strategy. 
Of special interest is a class of bandit problems that we label stationary 
bandits. A stationary bandit is an infinite-armed bandit in which all arms are 
a priori identical, that is, for all i E !n, we have (i) K(i) = K, (ii) f~ = fk, 
k = 1, ... , K, and (iii) p(i) = 1T E LlK- 1• Evidently, stationary bandits form a 
special case of the family of bandit problems described above; consequently, all 
of our results retain their validity in this setting as well. But the additional 
structure provided by the assumption of a priori identical arms often enables a 
considerable strengthening of the results that we prove to hold in general. 
These are described at the end of each section. 
3. THE DYNAMIC ALLOCATION INDEX 
Gittins and Jones (1974) proved that for finite-armed bandit problems of the 
type detailed above, an optimal strategy can be obtained through solving a 
family of stopping problems, thereby associating with each arm an index which 
depends solely on the current prior belief on that arm. This index, the dynamic 
allocation index or DAI (also frequently referred to as the Gittins index), plays a 
prominent role in our analysis of the framework outlined in Section 2. We 
describe in this section the construction of the DAI for a generic arm i, and 
derive some basic resulting properties. The proofs of all results in this section 
may be found in Appendix I. 
For simplicity, we suppress the dependence of the various parameters on i. 
Suppose arm i is one of K types. Let the corresponding reward densities be 
denoted (f1, ... , f K), with associated expected rewards R 1, . .. , RK. Let p E LlK-I 
denote the prior belief on arm i; R(p) = f,kpkRk the expected one period 
reward from playing arm i; and f(pX ·) = LkPdk( ·) the expected density of 
rewards. 
Consider the optimal stopping problem in which the principal's options in 
each period are either to play the sole available arm i for another period, or to 
"stop" the process and receive a terminal reward of m. Standard arguments 
(e.g., Whittle (1982), Ross (1983)) establish for each m, the existence of a 
continuous function V( ·; m): LlK-I---) ~. such that V(p; m) is the value to the 
principal of this stopping problem when the prior on arm i is p and the 
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terminal reward is m. Indeed, V( ·; m) may be obtained as the unique fixed-point 
of the contraction mapping7 T: C(L1K-l) ~ C(L1K- 1), where C(L1K- 1) is the 
space of all real-valued continuous functions on L1K- I endowed with the 
sup-norm topology, and, for v E C(L1K- 1), Tu is defined by 
( 3 .1) Tv ( p) = max { m , R ( p) + o J v [ (3 ( p ; r)] f ( p) ( r) dr} . 
Hence, V( ·; m) satisfies at each p: 
(3.2) V(p; m) =max { m, R(p) + o J V[f3(p; r); m]f(p)(r) dr}. 
The following lemma collects some additional properties of this optimization 
problem that are important in characterizing the DAI: 
LEMMA 3.1: (i) V( ·; m) is convex in p for each m. 
(ii) V(p; ·)is convex and nondecreasing in m for each p. 
(iii) V( ·; ·) is jointly continuous in p and m. 
The Dynamic allocation index of arm i when the prior on arm i is p, denoted 
M(p ), is then defined as: 
(3.3) M(p)=inf{mE~IV(p;m)=m}. 
Observe that if m ~ R1/[l - o], then we must also have V(p; m) = m, while 
evidently for m < RK/[l - o], V(p; m) > m. It follows that M( ·)takes values in 
the compact set [RK/(l - o), R1/(l - o)] and is, consequently, well-defined. 
For k = 1, ... , K, define ek to be that element of L1K-I with 1 in the kth 
place and zeros elsewhere. Recall that a real valued function h defined on a 
convex domain is said to be quasi-convex if for all c E ~.the set {x lh(x).,;;;; c} is 
convex. The following lemma gathers three properties of the DAI-continuity, 
quasi-convexity, and strict monotonicity along any ray through the " worst" prior 
-that play an important role in the sequel. 
LEMMA 3.2: (i) M( ·)is a continuous, quasi-convex function of p. 
(ii) Let pEL!K- 1, p-:/=eK. Then, M(Ap+(l-A)eK) is a strictly increasing 
function of ,\ for ,\ E [O, l]. 
4. EXISTENCE OF AN OPTIMAL STRATEGY 
We begin with a statement of the celebrated theorem of Gittins and Jones 
(1974) that establishes the existence of an optimal strategy when j)? has a finite 
number of elements. Then, we show (Theorem 4.1) that this result extends in a 
7 The equivalence of the original stopping problem which involves unknown parameters, and the 
dynamic programming problem for which the contraction is defined, is an intuitive result, but, as a 
referee pointed out to us, a nontrivial one. For a proof of this equivalence, see Rhenius (1974), 
Rieder (1975), or Schal (1979). 
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straightfotward manner to yield a general existence theorem for denumerable 
armed bandits. A subsequent example then shows that if the conditions of 
Theorem 4.1 are violated, optimal strategies need not exist. 
So, let M;( ·) represent the DAI function for arm i. The following result 
establishes the optimality of index strategies, i.e. strategies that at each point 
select any of the arms with the highest DAI at that point.8 
THEOREM 4.0 (Gittins and Jones (1974)): Suppose 9? consists of a finite 
number of elements {l, ... N}. Then, the uniquely optimal class of strategies are 
those which at each time t select any of the arms i for which 
where P 1 = (p1(1), .. . , p 1(N)) is the vector of priors at time t. 
REMARK: Since any optimal strategy continues to remain optimal if its 
recommendations are altered on a set of histories of collective probability zero, 
the uniqueness claim in Theorem 4.0 should be understood modulo this proviso. 
Namely, that a strategy is optimal if, and only if, the set of histories on which its 
recommendation differs from the DAI-maximal arm(s) has probability zero. 
Two obvious problems arise if this result is to be extended to an infinite 
number of arms. Namely, (a) the supremum of the DAis at the initial prior may 
not be attained, and (b) even if there is a well defined maximum at the initial 
beliefs, there may exist histories after which a DAI-maximal arm does not exist. 
It turns out, however, that these are also the only problems that arise, and if 
they are ruled out an identical result to Theorem 4.0 may be shown to hold for 
infinite-armed bandits as well. 
Some new definitions would help in stating the precise result. For each j E 9? , 
let X(j) denote the subset of strategies of X that begin with arm j. Let V*(P) 
be defined by V*(P) = supu e .I W(u; P). Note that V* is well defined for any 
P, since expected rewards are uniformly bounded (equation 2.1) and there is 
geometric discounting. Call an arm i an optimal initial selection at P if it is true 
that V*(P) = supue.I(i) W(u; P). The proof of the following result may be 
found in Appendix II. 
THEOREM 4.1: (i) Arm i is an optimal initial selection at P if and only if: 
(4.1) M;(P(i)) =sup{Mj(p(j))lie9?}. 
(ii) The only optimal strategies are those which always select a DAI-maximal 
arm, except possibly after a set of histories of collective probability zero. In 
8 It is worth noting that, within broad limits, the assumption of geometric discounting is also 
necessary for Theorem 4.0; see Berry and Fristedt (1986, Ch. 6). 
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particular, an optimal strategy exists from P if, and only if, either 
(a) there are infinitely many arms i such that M;(p(i)) ~ M*, or 
(b) there is an arm i such that M;(e K(i» ~ M*, 
where M* = sup{mlm ~Mip(j)) for infinitely many j}. 
1079 
REMARK 1: It is readily seen that the conditions (a) and (b) are sufficient for 
the index strategy to be well-defined, i.e., for there to exist a DAI-maximal arm 
after any history. A little reflection shows that these conditions are necessary as 
well. For, suppose both conditions were violated. If there are no arms i such 
that M;(p(i)) ~ M*, then evidently we are done. So suppose there is a finite set 
of arms I such that M;(p(i)) ~ M* if and only if i E /. Then, it must be the case 
under an index strategy, that with positive probability the index on all arms i E I 
drop strictly below M* in finite time. (This follows from the assumption that (b) 
is violated.) By definition of M*, the continuation index strategy is no longer 
well defined since for any e > 0, there are infinitely many arms whose indices 
are in (M* - e, M* ), but none equal to M*. 
REMARK 2: It is easy to construct examples where the conditions of Theorem 
4.l(ii) are not met, and no optimal strategies, therefore, exist. Consider the 
following: 
Example 4.1: Suppose arm 1 either generates a reward of 2 with certainty or 0 
with certainty, while arm n for n ~ 2 pays (1 - l/n) with certainty. Let the prior 
probability of the first situation be p. It is evident that for p sufficiently close to 
1, arm 1 is an optimal initial selection, but it is also clear that after the history in 
which the first period reward is 0, there is no optimal continuation strategy. 
REMARK 3: The assumption that the number of arms is countable (as op-
posed to a set of arms of arbitrary cardinality) is used only at a single point in 
the proof of Theorem 4.1. It seems likely that this condition can be dropped and 
the result generalized, but we do not have a proof. For a more detailed 
description of the issues involved, see the remark following the proof of 
Theorem 4.1 in Appendix II. 
An immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1 is the existence of an optimal "no 
recall" strategy for stationary bandit problems: 
COROLLARY 4.1: Optimal strategies always exist in stationary bandit problems. 
Moreover, the optimal strategy may be chosen to be one in which any arm that has 
been tried and discarded is never recalled. 
PRooF: Since all arms are a priori identical, they have the same DAI, 
denoted M( 'TT') (recall 'TT' is the prior on all arms), and existence follows from 
Theorem 4.1. Since, after any history, there are an infinite number of arms with 
DAI M( 'TT'), the following strategy is an optimal "no recall" strategy: begin with 
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arm 1, and move from arm i to arm i + 1 at the first time when the prior p(i) on 
arm i satisfies M(p(i)) < M( 'TT). Q.E.D. 
Note, however, that even in a stationary Bandit problem, there may exist 
optimal strategies that are not "no recall" strategies. For instance, an optimal 
strategy may choose to drop an arm i, in favor of an untried arm j, whenever 
the index on i is less than or equal to M( 'TT), but to return to it if the index on j 
drops below M( 'TT), and the index on i at the time it was dropped was exactly 
equal to M( 'TT). 
5. THE STOCHASTIC PROCESS OF SURVIVAL 
We now turn to an examination of the stochastic process governing the 
repeated use of an arm. Specifically, we are interested in the distribution of the 
number of periods a generic arm will continue to remain optimal, once it has 
been chosen. The analysis below does not distinguish between finite- and 
infinite-armed bandits, since nothing depends on this distinction. 
Let i be an arm that is an optimal choice at some vector of beliefs P = 
(p(l), p(2), ... ), i.e., which is such that M;(p(i)) = supi E ITT Mip(j)).9 Let m* = 
supi,,.; Mip(j)). Under the optimal strategy, the arm i will be retained as long 
as the prior p'(i) on it satisfies M;(p'(i));;., m*. Our aim in this section is to 
characterize the distribution of time for which this inequality will continue to 
hold. 
For notational ease, we suppress the index i in what follows, and denote the 
initial prior p(i) on arm i by 'TT. Let arm i be one of K possible types with 
reward densities / 1, ... , f K· We assume, without loss of generality, that at the 
initial prior we have 'TTk > 0 for k = 1, ... , K, so that no type is redundant. 
Recall that ek denotes that element of .1K-l that has zeros in all but the kth 
place. There are two cases possible: M(eK) ~ m*, and M(eK) < m*. In the first 
case, we clearly also have M(p) ~ m* for all p E .1K- 1, so that the arm will 
never be replaced regardless of the rewards it generates. The survival process is, 
therefore, trivial. In the sequel, we assume, consequently, that the second case 
holds, namely that M(eK)<m*. Note that we must have M(e1)>m*, for 
otherwise M( 'TT) ~ m* is not possible. 
Let .1R = {p E.1K- 1IM(p) <m*}, and .1A = {p E.1K- 11M(p) ;;i,m*}. The fol-
lowing lemma gathers some properties of these sets, where these are immediate 
consequences of the continuity and quasi-convexity of M( ·) [see Lemma 3.2(i)]. 
LEMMA 5.1: .1R is a convex, open subset, and .1A is a closed subset, of .1K-i. 
We introduce some additional notation now, and a relatively informal de-
scription of the probability measures required to examine the survival process. 
9 Such an arm will always exist, of course, if !Jl has only a finite number of elements. 
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A formal description may be found in Appendix III to this paper, where the 
results of this section are proved. 
Let supp fk = {rlfk(r) > O} denote the support of fk, k = 1, .. . , K, and let 
m = U .f=t supp fk · Define m1 to be the t-fold Cartesian product of m, with 
generic element r 1 = (r1, ... , r1 ). For each t, and for each k E {1, . .. , K}, define 
the density Ft on m 1 by 
t 
(5.1) Fk(r1,····r,)= ntk(rT). 
r=l 
Say that arm i survives at least t periods under the observed rewards 
(rl, ... ' r,) E m1 if the resulting sequence of posteriors {pT}~=l• calculated from 
the initial belief p(i) using these rewards, satisfies M( pr) ;?l:- m* for each 
T = 1, ... 't. Let 6 1 c m1 denote the set of all possible I-sequences of rewards 
under which an arm will survive at least t periods. This set is, of course, 
independent of the arm's true type. 
Now for k = 1, ... , K, and each positive integer t, let 
(5.2) Qk(t) = f F£(r 1 ) dr 1• 
16' 
Qk(t) is simply the probability that arm i will survive at least t periods, given 
that its true type is k. Let Uk= lim1 Qk(t) be the probability that arm i will 
survive forever given that its true type is k. Note that Uk is well defined since 
Qk(t) is nonincreasing in t. Finally, say that arm i survives forever with nonzero 
probability if Uk> 0 for some k = 1, .. . , K. 
Our main result in this section is precisely that arm i must survive forever 
with nonzero probability.10 Since both our choice of the initial prior P on the 
arms of the bandit, and the choice of i from the set of initially optimal arms at 
P, were arbitrary, this result establishes that any arm which becomes optimal at 
some point will, with positive probability remain optimal forever. We emphasize 
the independence of this result from the choice of discount factor S E [O, 1), and 
the form of the distributions (f k). 
THEOREM 5.1: There is k* E {1, ... , K} such that Uk* > 0. 
We sketch the arguments involved in proving Theorem 5.1 here. Consider the 
sequence of posterior beliefs {p1} on arm i that arise as observations on i are 
accumulated. Routine arguments (as employed, e.g., by Easley and Kiefer 
(1988)) establish that this sequence of posteriors must follow a Martingale 
process with respect to the probability measure P,,. generated on the space of 
sample paths by the prior belief 1T. 
10 Our original result was for the case K = 2, and employed a direct proof that, in fact, U1 was 
nonzero. An outline of the proof for the case of general K was suggested to us by Andy McLennan, 
who also provided the sketch of Example 5.1. 
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Now, note that .:iR is a convex set, and TT e int .:iK-l is a point not in this set, 
so there exists a linear functional I separating the two. Moreover, I divides 
.:iK-l into two convex sets .11 and .12 such that .11 c.:iA, and .:iR c.1 2 ; and there 
exists a constant c such that l(p);;;.. c for all p e .11, and l(p) < c for all p e .12 • 
Consider a stronger rejection rule than that specified under M, namely, the one 
under which an arm is rejected in favor of an untried arm at the first t for which 
l(p') < c, i.e., for which /(p') e .12 ::> .:iR. 
Since I is linear, /(p') is itself a Martingale. A fundamental result in the 
theory of Martingales (see Proposition Al, Appendix III) states that with 
nonzero Prr probability, /(p') will stay above c forever, so that, in particular, 
l(p') will stay in .:iA forever with nonzero P"' probability. Letting Pk denote the 
probability measure induced on the space of sample paths by the type-parame-
ter k (i.e., by the belief ek), it now follows as a simple consequence that with 
nonzero Pk probability for some k, M(p') will remain in .:iA forever. The last 
statement is precisely that Uk > 0 for some k. 
Now, let Z be the subset of {l, ... , K} defined by Z = {klM(ek) ;;i:.M(TT)}. It 
appears a reasonable conjecture that all arms of type k e Z will survive forever 
with nonzero probability. Surprisingly, even a weaker version of this conjecture 
turns out to be false. Namely, the fact that an arm of type k* will survive 
forever with nonzero probability has no implications, in general, for the "better" 
types k e {l, ... , k* - 1}.11 In the example below, a type 2 arm survives forever 
with probability l, but a type 1 arm is rejected in finite time with probability 1. 
Example 5.1: Consider a stationary Bandit in which each arm is one of the 
same three possible types. The initial belief is P ={TT, TT, ... }, where TT e .12 will 
be specified shortly. The reward space is discrete and equals {O, 1, 2}. The 
reward probabilities associated with the types are described in the matrix below 
(e is any number satisfying 0 < e < (1/4)): 
Pr{r= O} Pr{r = 1} Pr{r= 2} 
Type 1 E I 4-e 2 
Type2 0 1 0 
Type3 4-e I E 2 
Note that R 1 = ~ - 2e > 1 = R 2 > i + 2e = R 3• Fix any 8 e [O, 1), and let M( ·) 
represent the DAI function for this problem, where M( ·) is, of course, the same 
for all arms. Recall that, by Corollary 4.1, the optimal strategy may be chosen to 
be a no-recall index strategy. 
The reasoning underlying this example comes in two parts. First, for any 
p = (p1, p 2 , p 3) e .12 , p 3 > 0, the Bayes updating rule for this problem has the 
important feature that 
11 Note, however, that arms of type k ~ Z must fail in finite time with probability 1. This follows 
since the consistency of Bayes updating implies their true type will be revealed with probability 1 if 
they are played forever, so that M(p1) falls below M(7T) in finite time with probability 1. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Fri, 18 Mar 2016 18:05:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DENUMERABLE-ARMED BANDITS 1083 
i.e., the relative probabilities of types 1 and 3 are unaffected by a reward of 1. 
Combining (5.3) with the fact that a type 2 arm generates a reward of 1 with 
probability 1, it is readily seen that the posterior on an arm that has generated a 
reward sequence of l's followed by a reward of 2, is simply {3( 7T, 2) regardless of 
the length of the sequence of l's. Similarly, after any sequence of l's, the first 
reward of 0 always leads to the posterior {3( 7T, 0). 
Second, we show that, if in the specification of 7T = ( 7T 1, 7T 2 , 1 - 7T 1 - 7T 2), 7T 1 
is chosen to be sufficiently small, then we can satisfy M(f3( 7T, 2)) < M( 7T ). The 
intuition behind the second step is that, given the relatively small probability of 
a type 1, a reward of 2 acts as a "signal" that the arm could be a type 3. This 
makes continuing to play the arm an unattractive option. 
Combining these steps, it easily follows that an arm will be discarded at the 
first time it generates a reward of 2. To complete the example, we show the 
intuitive result that M(f3( 7T, 0)) < M(f3( 7T, 2)), so that an arm will also be 
discarded the very first time it generates a reward of 0. 
We first show that 7T can be specified to satisfy M(f3(7T,2)) <M(7T). Let the 
prior probability of a type 2 arm be any 7Tz E (0, 1). Fixing 7Tz, define for each 
7T 1 E[O,1- 7T2 ], 7T*(7T 1) = (7T 1, 7Tz, 1- 7T 1 - 7T 2). It is immediate from the Bayes 
updating formula that, as 7T 1 ~ 0, we have {31( 7T*(7T 1), 2) ~ 0 and f3 3(7T*(7T1), 2) 
~ 1. By the continuity of M( ·) [Lemma 3.2], we have: 
(5.4) lim M( 7T 1, 7Tz, 1 - 7T 1 - 7Tz) = M(O, 7Tz, 1 - 7Tz) 
1T1 -+O 
';!; 7T2 R2/(1 - S) + (1 - 7Tz) R3/(1 - S) 
>R3/(l - S) 
=M(e3 ) = lim M[f3(7r*(7T 1),2)]. 
1T1 -+O 
It easily follows that for 7T 1 > 0, but sufficiently small, we have M(7T*(7T1)) > 
M[f3( 7T*( 7T 1), 2)]. Picking any such 7T 1, this step is complete. 
Next, note that (a) M(-) is strictly increasing on the ray joining e3 and e1 by 
Lemma 3.2, and (b) {31(7T,0)<{31(7T,2), while {32(7T,0)={32(7T,2)=0. Combin-
ing these, we have M[f3( 7T, O)] < M[f3( 7T, 2)]. 
It now follows easily that survival occurs up to period t if, and only if, the 
reward in each of the first (t - 1) periods is 1. Since the probability of a type 1 
arm producing rewards of 1 forever is 0, such an arm must fail in finite time 
with probability 1. 12 On the other hand, a type two arm produces rewards of 1 
forever with probability 1, and, hence, survives forever with probability 1. 
We now state a sufficient condition under which Uk> 0 implies ~ > 0 for all 
l E {1, ... , k - l}. Some new definitions are required. We say the densities 
(/1, ••• , fK) possess the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) if for all 
12 Indeed, in this example the expected length of continuous use for a type 1 arm (as also for a 
type 3 arm) is just 4 periods. 
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k, l E {1, . .. , K} such that k < l, and for all a, b E supp fk u supp f 1 such that 
a >b, 
fk(a) ·f1(b) - fk(b) ·f1(a) ~ 0. 
In particular, the likelihood ratio fk(r) /ft(r) is nondecreasing in r whenever 
f 1(r) -=!= 0.13 We note that two of the most frequently used distributions in 
decision problems, namely the Bernoulli and the normal (with known variance 
and unknown mean) satisfy MLRP, as do many others. Say that fk stochastically 
dominates f 1 if for all increasing functions h : ~ -+ ~. 
Ross (1983) proves that MLRP implies stochastic dominance; hence assuming 
(f1, ••• , fK) satisfy MLRP guarantees that for all types k, l of an arm such that 
k < l, we have that fk stochastically dominates f 1. 
THEOREM 5.2:14 Suppose the reward densities satisfy the MLRP. Then, for any 
positive integer t, it is the case that 
The proof of Theorem 5.2 (found in Appendix III) essentially consists of two 
parts. First, we show that MLRP and the resulting stochastic dominance imply 
that at any prior a "cutoff rule" is optimal; namely, that for each p E JK-1, 
there exists an a(p) in the closure of m (possibly equal to inf m or sup ffl) such 
that M[~(p, r )] ~ m* if, and only if, r ~ a(p ). The second part shows that if a 
cutoff rule is optimal, then stochastic dominance implies that Qk(t) must be 
decreasing in k. 
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.2, we obtain the following 
Corollary: 15 
COROLLARY 5.1: Under the conditions of Theorem 5.2, U1 ~ U2 ~ · • • ~ UK, 
with U1 >0. 
Hence under MLRP the "best" type of an arm lasts forever with positive 
probability, and "better" types last forever at least as often as do "worse" types 
(where recall the "better than/worse than" ordering is determined by the types' 
expected one-period reward). 
13 a. Grossman and Hart (1983) and Milgrom (1981) for economic applications employing the 
MLRP assumption. 
14 We are grateful to Martin Hellwig for suggesting that we examine monotone likelihood ratios 
as a condition under which the conclusions of Theorem 5.2 obtain. 
15 In Banks and Sundaram (1991) we provide a further characterization of the survival process, 
including an examination of the conditional probabilities of a type k arm surviving at least t + 1 
periods given that it has survived t periods. We show that for any k such that Uk > 0, these 
conditional probabilities must converge to unity, but that this convergence could be highly non-
monotone even assuming the densities satisfy MLRP. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Fri, 18 Mar 2016 18:05:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DENUMERABLE-ARMED BANDITS 1085 
We next turn our attention to an implication of Theorem 5.1 for stationary 
bandits: 
COROLLARY 5.2: In a stationary bandit problem, the expected number of arms 
used in an optimal strategy is finite. In particular, with probability 1 the optimal 
strategy requires the use of only a finite number of arms. 
PRooF: Since all arms are a priori identical, the probability that any arm will 
last forever from the time it is initially chosen is independent of the arm's 
identity. Let a denote this probability; by Theorem 5.1, a> 0. Since an arm is 
never recalled under the DAI strategy if it has been tried and discarded, the 
probability that exactly n arms are used is clearly a(l - a)n- 1• Therefore, the 
expected number of arms that will be used is I:~~ 1[na(l - a)n- 1] = l/a < oo. 
Q.E.D. 
We conclude this section with an example which illustrates the predictions of 
Corollary 5.2. To solve for the principal's optimal strategy we employ a result 
from Banks and Sundaram (1990) establishing the optimality of "myopic" 
strategies (i.e., strategies that recommend the arm to be played in each period 
purely as a function of the immediate expected reward from each arm) when all 
arms of the bandit are one of the same two possible types. Formally, the myopic 
strategy u(m) is the strategy that at each time t, given the beliefs P' at t, picks 
any of the arms i for which 
R(p 1 ( i)) =max { R(p'(j) )Ii E ITT}. 
THEOREM 5.316 (Banks and Sundaram (1990)): Suppose K(i) = 2 for all i, 
and that ff= fk for all i E ITT, k = 1,2. Then, u(m) is an optimal strategy 
whenever it is well-defined. 
Example 5.2: Consider a stationary bandit problem in which each arm is one 
of the same two possible types. The reward distributions from either type are 
Bernoulli with qk [resp. (1 - qk)] being the probability of a reward of 1 [resp. of 
O] from a type k arm, k = 1, 2. Let q 1 = 1 - q2 • As usual, we assume that type 1 
arms are "better", so we have q 1 > 1/2 > q2 • Applying Bayes' rule, and invok-
ing Theorem 5.3, an arm survives for at least t periods if, and only if, the 
reward sequence r 1 = (r~, ... , r{) satisfies 
s(r 1;T) ;:i.f(r';T) (T= l, ... ,t), 
16 Several points are worth noting about this result. First, Banks and Sundaram (1990) actually 
prove this result for finite-armed bandits; however, their proof shows that the recommendations of 
the myopic strategy and the DAI strategy always coincide under the given conditions, so that 
whenever the conditions of Theorem 4.l(ii) above are satisfied myopic strategies are well-defined 
and optimal in denumerable-armed bandits as well. Second, Theorem 5.3 is valid regardless of the 
value of 8 E [O, 1), in particular even for 8 arbitrarily close to 1. Third, the assumption of only two 
possible types is crucial; in Banks and Sundaram (1991) we provide a three-type example (with, in 
fact, the reward densities satisfying MLRP) and show that myopic strategies are strictly suboptimal. 
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where s(r';T) [resp. f(r';T)] denotes the number of l's [resp. O's] in the first T 
observations of r'. 
The survival rule for this example has the interesting implication that the 
stochastic process of the continued use of an arm of type k can be viewed as a 
random walk on the integers beginning at 1, with the probability of a "right" 
move ( + 1) equal to qk, the probability of a "left" move ( -1) equal to (1 - qk), 
and with an absorbing barrier at zero. Standard results in the theory of random 
walks (see, e.g., Feller (1968)) tell us the following about these processes. Since 
q2 < 1/2, with probability 1 the random walk under q2 will get absorbed at zero 
in finite time. The expected time to absorption (i.e., the expected length of time 
a type 2 arm will remain in continuous play) is [1/(1 - 2q2)] + 1. On the other 
hand, since q 1 > 1/2, the random walk with parameter q1 will, with probability 
[2q1 - 1]/q1 > 0, never get absorbed. For instance, if q1 = 3/4, and q2 = 1/4, 
then a type 1 arm will last forever with probability 2/3, while a type 2 arm 
enjoys an expected length of continuous play of only 3 periods. Finally, if 
'1T1 = '1T2 = 1/2, then the expected number of arms used is 3. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The results of this paper have shown that the optimal strategies in indepen-
dent armed bandit problems with geometric discounting have strong properties. 
Many open questions remain. 
Within the context of this paper, there is the issue of the generalization of our 
existence result from one retaining validity when the number of arms is 
countable, to one holding even when the number of arms has arbitrary cardinal-
ity. This question is not, perhaps, of technical interest alone, since, as a referee 
remarked, one feels that the "right" proof of the Gittins-Jones result ought not 
to depend on the cardinality of the set of arms. The remark at the end of 
Appendix II offers some intuition why, in the latter case, it is possible that 
attention may be restricted to a countable set of arms without loss of generality. 
If this is true, than Theorem 4.1 may be invoked showing that an optimal index 
strategy continues to exist under suitable conditions. 
Secondly, there are many possible generalizations of the bandit framework 
which would make them more widely applicable in economic settings. Perhaps 
the most compelling is to introduce a cost of switching between arms. It is 
certainly difficult to imagine a relevant economic decision problem in which the 
decision-maker may costlessly switch between alternatives. It is therefore of 
interest to inquire as to whether a suitably defined index strategy would 
continue to be optimal; and the extent to which the results of this paper would 
continue to remain valid. 
One very restrictive aspect of bandit problems, especially from the point of 
view of applications, is that only one arm may be used in a given period. This 
precludes situations in which the decision maker may learn about several 
options simultaneously. There are (at least) two possible ways to resolve this 
issue. The first is to allow the decision maker to sample up to m ~ 1 arms in 
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each period, where m is a priori fixed. 17 An alternative framework, which may 
be viewed as a model of research and development under budgetary constraints, 
is the following. The decision maker is modeled as distributing a single unit of 
available "effort" over the arms (research projects). The more effort that is put 
into an arm, the more reliable the reading from that arm regarding the true 
payoff prospects of that arm (say, the variance of observations is inversely 
proportional to the effort put into the arm). Secondly, if no effort is put into an 
arm, no reward is witnessed. When an additional constraint is appended that all 
the effort has to be put into a single arm, we obtain the framework of this 
paper. 
Dept. of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, U. SA. 
Manuscript received August, 1990; final revision received March, 1992. 
APPENDIX I 
l.l Proof of Lemma 3.1 
To prove part (i), we adopt the techniques of McLennan (1988). Let m be given. Define the 
mapping T on the space C(.dK- l) as in Section 3. For notational ease, define, for w E C(.dK- l ), (i) 
Gw(p)= fw({:J(p;r))f(p)(r)dr, and (ii) Hw(p)=R(p)+8Gw(p). We proceed in two steps. 
Step 1: We show that if w is convex, then Tw is also convex. Let p,p' e4K- 1, and let 
p* = (1-A)p + Ap' for some A E (0, 1). Define, for each r in the support of the densities (fk), e(r) 
E (0, 1) by e(r) · f(p*)(r) = Af(p')(r) [or, equivalently, (1 - e(r )) · f(p*)(r) = (1 - A)f(p)(r )). The 
significance of this choice of e(r) is that (1 - e(r ))f:J(p, r) + e(r )f:J(p' r) = f:J(p*, r) for any r, since 
for each k E {1, ... , K}, we have 
f:Jk(p*, r) = Ptfk(r )lf(p*)(r) 
= [(1-A)pk +Apk]fk(r)/f(p*)(r) 
= {(l-A)f(p)(r)/f(p*)(r)} ·f:Jk(p,r) 
+ {Af(p')(r )!f(p*)(r )} · f:Jk(P', r) 
= (1-e(r))f:Jk(p,r) +e(r)f:Jk(p',r). 
Suppose, now, that w is convex. Then, 
(1.1) Gw(p*) = J w(f:J(p*;r))f(p*)(r)dr 
= J w[(l - e(r ))f:J(p, r) + e(r )f:J(p', r )]f(p*)(r) dr 
,;;; j[(l-e(r))w(f:J(p,r)) +e(r)w(f:J(p'r))]f(p*)(r)dr 
= j(l-A)w(f:J(p,r))f(p)(r)dr+ J Aw(f:J(p',r))f(p')(r)dr 
= (1-A)Gw(p) +AGw(p'), 
where the inequality obtains by Jensen's Inequality for convex functions. 
17 Of course, this framework may be viewed as a bandit problem with (::,) dependent arms, but 
there does not appear to be much gain conceptually from doing so. 
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Now observe that since R( ·) is linear, Hw is also convex whenever w is. As the maximum of 
convex functions, Tw then inherits the convexity of w. This completes Step 1. 
Step 2: Let l!B be the set of all convex w such that w.;;;; Tw. Evidently, l!B is bounded above and 
nonempty. Let w* be defined by 
{I.2) w*(p) = sup{w(p)lw El!B}. 
As the pointwise supremum of convex functions, w* is convex. We will first show that w* E l!B, so 
that w* .;;;; Tw*. 
First, note that T is a monotone operator: v.;;;; w implies Tu.;;;; Tw. Therefore, w*(p) = 
sup{w(p)lw E l!B}.;;;; sup{Tw(p)lw E l!B}, by definition of l!B. In addition, by the monotonicity of T, 
we also have sup{Tw(p)lw E l!B}.;;;; Tw*(p). Combining these observations, we see that w*.;;;; Tw*, 
and so w* E l!B. 
Now, for all w E l!B, we have w.;;;; Tw, so by the monotonicity of T, we also have Tw.;;;; T(Tw ). 
This means that Tw E l!B whenever w E l!B. In particular, Tw* E l!B. Therefore, by the definition of 
w*, we must have w* ;;. Tw*. Summing up, we have Tw* = w*, or w* is a fixed-point of the 
mapping T. But T is a contraction and has a unique fixed-point. Therefore, it must be the case that 
w*( ·) = V( ·; m), proving Lemma 3.l(i). 
Part (ii) of Lemma 3.1, (the convexity and monotonicity of Vin m for each fixed p) is established 
in Berry and Fristedt (1985, Lemma 6.1.2), who also prove that V is continuous in m for each 
fixed p. 
Finally, we turn to Lemma 3.l(iii). Recall that V is continuous in m for each p, while the 
construction of V( ·; m) as a fixed point of the contraction T, establishes continuity in p for each m. 
We show that this separate continuity of V, combined with its monotonicity in m, implies joint 
continuity in p and m. 
So let (pn, mn)--> (p, m). Define hn( ·) = V(pn, · ), and h( ·) = V(p, · ). We need to show that 
hn(mn)--> h(m) as n--> ao. 
First, note that for each n, hn is a continuous, nondecreasing function, as is h. Therefore, by 
Belly's Selection Theorem (Billingsley (1979, p. 290)) there is a subsequence of hn (again denoted 
by hn), and a right-continuous, nondecreasing function h* such that hn(m)--> h*(m) at each 
continuity point m of h*. Note also that for each m, h n(m) --> h(m) by the separate continuity of 
V(·;m). 
First, we claim that h* = h. To see this, note that since h* is a monotone function, its values 
everywhere are completely determined by the dense set of its continuity points. But at any such m, 
h* and h must agree, by definition of these functions, establishing the claim. 
Next, we claim that if h* is continuous from the right [resp. left] at any m, then for all mn --> m, 
we have limsupn hn(mn).;;;; h*(m) [resp. Jim inf hn(mn);;. h*(m)]. This will establish that for all 
sequences mn--> m, hn(mn)--> h*(m), since by the earlier claim, h* = h, and h is, of course, 
continuous everywhere. 
To see the claim, suppose first that h* is right-continuous at m. Pick a sequence mk such that 
mk > m for each k and mk--> m, and such that for each k, mk is a continuity point of h*. Since the 
continuity points of h* are dense this is possible. Fix any k. Since mn--> m, mn < mk for all k 
sufficiently large. Since each hn is nondecreasing, hn(mn).;;;; hn(mk). Since mk is a continuity point 
of h*, hn(mk)--> h*(mk) as n--> ao. Combining the last two statements, limsupn hn(mn).;;;; h*(mk). 
Since this holds for each mk, and h* is continuous from the right by hypothesis, taking limits as 
k --> ao establishes one part of the claim. The other part is established by an analogous argument 
exploiting the left-continuity of h*. This completes the proof of joint-continuity. Q.E.D. 
1.2. Proof of Lemma 3.2 
We begin with two claims: 
CLAIM 1: M(p);;.R(p)/(l-8) foral/pE,jx- 1• 
PROOF: For any m, and for all p, it is the case that V(p; m);;. R(p)/(l - 8), since the right-hand 
side is merely the expected payoff from the strategy that never chooses the terminal reward after 
any history. Since V(p; M(p)) = M(p), Claim 1 follows. Note that if p = ek for any k, then 
M(p) = R(p)/(l - 8). Q.E.D. 
Next, for p E,jx-i, m E ~'let 
{1.3) HV(p; m) = R(p) + 8 J V[J3(p; r ); m ]f(P )(r) dr. 
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CLAIM 2: HV(p; m) ~mas m ~ M(p). 
PROOF: If p = ek for some k, this is obvious, so suppose p * ek for any k. Let mk = M(ek) = 
Rkf(l - ll). Since V(p; m) > m for any m ~ mK, we must have HV(p; m) > m for any m ~ mK. 
Similarly, since V(p; m) = m for any m;;. m 1, we must also have HV(p;.m) ~ m for any such m, 
and, indeed, it is not too difficult to see that we must have strict inequality here. HV(p; ·)evidently 
inherits the properties of continuity and convexity in m from V(p; · ). By continuity, it follows that 
there exists a value of m, say m* E (mK, m 1), such that HV(p; m*) = m*. Pick any such m*, and 
consider any m' such that m' =Am*+ {1-A)m1, for A E (0, 1). Note that m' > m*. The convexity of 
HV(p; ·) now implies 
{I.4) HV(p;m') ~AHV(p;m*) + (l -A)HV(p;m1) 
<Am*+ {1-A)m1 =m'. 
But this inequality shows that m* must be unique; that is, there exists only one value of m* 
satisfying HV(p;m*)=m* . Therefore, for m <m*, we must have HV(p;m)>m, while for 
m > m*, we must have HV(p; m) < m. (Otherwise, the Intermediate Value Theorem furnishes a 
contradiction.) Finally, since V(p;m*)=HV(p;m*)=m*, and for m<m*, we have V(p;m)= 
HV(p; m) > m, so it is the case that m* = M(p), proving claim 2. Q.E.D. 
Returning to the proof of the lemma, let Pn -> p, and mn = M(pn). Since M( · ) takes values in a 
compact set, we may, without loss of generality, assume that mn -> m. By Lemma 3.l(i), V(pn; mn) 
-> V(p; m). The joint continuity of V in its arguments evidently implies that HV is also continuous 
jointly in p and m. Therefore, HV(pn;mn)-> HV(p;m). Since mn = V(pn;mn) = HV(pn; mn) for 
all n (the last equality obtaining by Claim 2), m = V(p;m)=HV(p;m). By Claim 2, this implies 
m = M(p), establishing continuity of M( · ). 
To see quasi-convexity of Min p, let p,p'eJ.K- 1, and let Pµ.=µp+(l-µ)p'. Assume, 
without loss of generality, that M(p);;. M(p'). Then, we are required to show that M(pl") ~ M(p). 
Since M(p) ;;.M(p'), we have V(p'; M(p)) = M(p)by Claim 2, while, of course, V(p; M(p)) = M(p). 
Since V is convex in p for each m by Lemma 3.l(ii), we have 
{I.5) V( p"'; M(p)) ~µV(p; M(p)) + {1- µ)V(p'; M(p)) = M(p ). 
Since it is true that V(p ; m);;. m for any m, the foregoing implies V(p"' ; M(p)) = M(p), so by 
definition of M( · ), M(pJ ~ M(p), proving quasi-convexity. This completes the proof of part (i) of 
Lemma 3.2. 
Now, let p * eK, and let p(A) = Ap + (l -A)eK for A e (0, 1). We show that M(p) > M(p(A)) > 
M(eK). Observe that the quasi-convexity of M(-) on the "ray" {p(A)lp(A) = Ap + (1 - A)eK for 
A e (0, 1)}, already implies that M( ·) is nondecreasing on the ray, since eK is a minimum for M( ·) 
on this ray (indeed, on J.K- 1). Combining these statements, part (ii) of Lemma 3.2 easily follows. 
Evidently, M(eK) = RK/ (1- ll) < M(p). In proving Lemma 1, we showed that the convexity of 
V( ·; m) in p also implies the convexity of HV( ·; m) in p. Therefore, we have 
(1.6) HV(p(A); M(p )) ~AHV(p; M(p)) + (1 -A)HV( eK; M(p)) 
<AM(p) + {1-A)M{p) 
=M(p), 
since HV(p; M(p)) = M(p) by definition, and HV(eK; M(p)) < M(p) by Claim 2. But this implies, 
in turn, that M(p(A)) < M(p). Evidently, M(p(A));;. R(p(A))/(1 - ll) > RK/ (l - ll) = M(eK), so 
M(p) > M(p(A)) > M(eK). Q.E.D. 
APPENDIX II 
Proof of Theorem 4.1 
For ease of exposition, we suppress dependence on the vector of priors P throughout. For each 
integer n, let In denote the subset of I that consists of strategies that use only one of the first n 
arms after any possible history. Let Vn =sup {W(u )lu E In}. We show as a first step that V* = 
limnVn. 
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Since !n can obviously be associated with the n-armed bandit problem in which only arms 
{1, ... , n} are available (and the initial prior is the appropriate restriction of P to this set), Theorem 
4.0 ensures the existence of un* E !n such that V,, = W(u,;") ;;. W(u) Vu E !n. Moreover, un* must be 
a DAI strategy as described in Theorem 4.0. It is evident that we must have Vn,;;; Vn+l,;;; V* for all 
n, since any strategy feasible in !n is also feasible in !n+l and !. Therefore, limn Vn is 
well-defined. 
Let e > 0 be given. Pick u E ! such that W(u) ;;. V* - e /2. By definition of V*, such a u may 
be seen to exist. Also pick t(e) to be any positive integer that satisfies 
(11.1) 81«>R* /[1 - 8] ,;;; e /8, 
where R* is defined by (2.1). Since R* is finite and 8 < 1, such a t(e) exists. Let T/ > 0 be such that 
'11 • R* /[1 - 8],;;; e /8. Finally, pick any n large enough to ensure that the probability that u uses an 
arm not in {1, ... , n} in the first t(e) periods is smaller than T/. (Note that this step depends on the 
assumption that the number of arms is countable.) 
Pick any m;;. n. Consider the strategy um E !m that imitates u for the first t(e) periods, or as 
long as feasible, and then proceeds arbitrarily. By definition of Vm we have 
(11.2) 
Since the probability that um will be able to imitate u in each of the first t(e) periods is at least 
1 - 'IJ, and the maximum penalty in any period from not being able to do so is 2R* (which occurs 
when the arm suggested by u gives a reward of R*, while all available options to um yield - R* ), it 
is also true that 
(11.3) W(u)-W(um),;;; 2'1)R* /[1-8] + (l-'11)28 1<•>R* /[1-8] 
,;;; 2'1)R* /[1-8] + 2l)'MR* /[1 - 8] 
,;;; e/4 + e/4 = e/2. 
So, certainly, from the definitions of t(e) and 'I), 
(11.4) W(u)- Vm .;;;e/2. 
Therefore, we now have 
(11.5) V* -Vm = (V* - W(u)) + (W(u)-Vm) 
,;;;e/2+e/2=e. 
Since e > 0 was arbitrary, we have shown that V* =limn Vn. 
Now, suppose that i attains the sup in (4.1). By Theorem 4.0, for any n ;;. i, there exists a strategy 
un* E !n that begins with arm i and satisfies W(un*) = Vn- Therefore, 
(11.6) sup W( u) ;;. Jim V,, = V*, 
uE};(i) n 
proving the "if' part of Theorem 4.l(i). 
To check the "only if' part, suppose there were j such that Mi(p(j)) > M;(p(i)). Let ut e!(i) 
n !n be that strategy that begins with arm i, and then proceeds optimally within {l, ... , n}, and let 
L;Vn represent the corresponding payoff W(ut). It is immediate from Theorem 4.0 that Vn - L;Vn 
> 0, for all n;;. max {i, j}. In fact, it is straightforward to verify from Whittle's (1982, p. 216, eq. 6) 
explicit expression for V,, - L;Vn the intuitive result that V,, - L;Vn remains bounded away from 
zero as n --> oo. It is also clear that L;V,,--> supu e :E(!) W(u ), establishing Theorem 4.l(i). 
To see part (ii) of the Theorem, suppose first that condition (a) is satisfied. Let I= 
{ie!nlM;(p(i));;.M*}. Define the subsets {Id} of I iteratively as follows. I 1 ={iEIIM;(p(i));;. 
Mip(j)) for all j E /}, and for integers d;;. 2, Id= {i E IIM;(p(i));;. Mi(p(j)) for all j EI -
I1 - .•• - Id_ 1}. From the definition of M* and the maintained hypothesis that condition (a) is 
satisfied, it is easily seen that Id is nonempty for each d. Therefore there is an enumeration 
{i(l), i(2), ... } of the elements of I such that M;(n)[p(i(n))];;. M;cn + 1Jp(i(n + 1))] for all n. Let u(oo) 
be the index strategy, i.e., the strategy which begins with i(l) and chooses at any point, one of the 
arms with the highest index at that point. By the above arguments, u(oo) is well-defined. We show 
that W(u( oo )) = V*. 
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Pick any positive integer n, and choose an integer µ,(n) sufficiently large so that {i(l), ... , i(n)} c 
(1, . . . , µ,(n)J. Let uµ.(n)(oo) be that strategy in .l"µ(n) that follows u(oo) as long as feasible (i.e., as long 
as the recommendations of u(oo) are within (1, .. . , µ,(n)}), and proceeds arbitrarily within 
(1, ... , µ,(n)J otherwise. Since u(oo) and uµ.(n)(oo) coincide for at least n periods, we have 
(11.7) 
Since there is a DAI strategy that is optimal in .l"µ.(n) and coincides with uµ.(n)(oo) for at least n 
periods, it is also the case that 
{11.8) 
Combining these inequalities, 
(11.9) IW( u(oo)) - vµ.(n) I~ 45nR* /(1 - 8)--> 0 as n--> oo. 
Taking limits as n--> oo, and noting that Vµ.(n)--> V* as n--> oo (since µ,(n)--> oo as n--> oo), the 
desired result is established. 
So now suppose condition (a) does not hold, but condition (b) does. Let /* = {i E 9llM;[p(i)];;. 
M*J. Since there is at least one arm i for which M;(eK(i)];;. M*, I* is nonempty. Moreover, I* is at 
most finite since condition (a) does not hold. By Theorem 4.0, there is an optimal index strategy 
when the set of arms is restricted to I*. Denote this strategy by u*, and let Vi* be the associated 
value. Pick any N such that /* c (1, ... , NJ. Invoking Theorem 4.0 once again, there is an optimal 
index strategy when the set of arms is restricted to (1, ... , NJ. By definition of M*, and since /* 
contains at least one i such that M;[eK(i)];;. M*, this strategy will never use an arm outside /*. 
Therefore, VN = Vi*· Since VN--> V* as N--> oo, we are done. 
Finally, suppose both conditions (a) and (b) were violated. Then, it must be the case (see Remark 
1 after the statement of Theorem 4.1) that there exists a set of histories that occur with positive 
probability, after which the index strategy is not well-defined, i.e., after any of these histories, there 
is no arm whose DAI attains the supremum of the indices. It follows from part (i) of the Theorem 
that no optimal continuation strategy now exists. Since the set of histories admitting no optimal 
continuation has positive probability, no optimal strategy can exist in the original problem either, 
completing the proof of the Theorem. Q.E.D. 
REMARK: The assumption that there are only a countable number of arms was used to prove that 
V* = limn Vm specifically to ensure that if n was chosen large enough, then the probability that u 
would use an arm not in (1, . .. , nJ in the first t(e) periods could be made less than '11 · Note that if an 
index strategy was optimal even if the set of arms was of arbitrary cardinality, it would immediately 
imply that attention could be restricted to a countable subset of the arms (those with the highest 
indices) without loss of generality. On the other hand, the following informal argument seems to 
suggest that even in bandit problems where the number of arms is of arbitrary cardinality, one may 
restrict oneself, without loss of generality, to a countable subset. Suppose for simplicity, that an 
optimal strategy does exist, and say it begins with arm i. Since the arms are independent, when arm 
i is in use no information is being accumulated about arms j * i . Therefore, if it is optimal to 
discard i in favor of j after some history h, and i in favor of k after some other history h', then it 
"must" be optimal to switch to j after the history h' also. Similarly, in considering a switch away 
from j (but not to i) it "should" suffice to have only one arm to which all switches occur. And so on. 
Of course, this argument is, in one sense, merely restating the intuition behind why an index strategy 
is likely to be optimal in this case also, but it appears to point to a generalization of Theorem 4.1. 
Note that the conditions of the Theorem would still remain sufficient conditions if these arguments 
are valid. 
APPENDIX III 
Ill.l: Proof of Theorem 5.1 
We develop formally the ideas sketched in the text. The proof is in several steps. 
Step 0: A Preliminary Result. The following Proposition is an immediate consequence of Proposi-
tion IV-3-12 of Neveu (1975). 
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PRorosmoN A.1: Let (X1) be a uniformly bounded martingale on a probability space (fl, 15, P) 
relative to the sub-sigma fields (8' 1), and let X* denote the almost sure limit 18 of the martingale (X1). 
Let T be a stopping time for the martingale. Define the random variable X 7 by X,(w) = XT(w)(w), if 
T(w) is finite, and X,(w) = X*(w) otherwise. Then, E[X7 ] = E[XiJ. 
Step 1: Recall that p(i) is denoted by 'TT. By Lemma 5.1, the set ..1n = (plM(p) < m*} is a convex 
and relatively open subset of .JK-l (henceforth, just ..1). Moreover, 'TT, which is an interior point of 
..1, is a point not in this set. Hence, the application of a standard separation argument implies the 
existence of a linear functional I on IRK and a constant c e IR, such that the hyperplane {xl!(x) = c} 
divides ..1 into two convex subsets ..11 and ..12 with ..1nc..11, ..12c..1A, and l(p)<c for all pe..11, 
l(p);;, c for all p e ..1 2. By these containment relations we have, of course, that M(p) < M('TT) = 
l(p) < l('TT). 
Step 2: Recall that !R is the union of supp fk over k. Define (i) !R 1 =X;_ 1m, (ii) m-1 = x;_ 1 + 1!R, 
and (iii) !R* =x;'_1!R. Let 8'(!R 1) represent the Borel sigma field of !R 1• Define the family {.9'1} of 
increasing sigma fields on !R* by 15 1 =(Ac !R* IA= c x m- 1; c E 8'(!R 1)}. Let 8'* = V,':18' 1• 
Next, let Z = {1, ... , K}, and let 8'(Z) denote the power set of Z. Finally, define fl= Z x !R*, 
and endow fl with the sigma-field 8'(fl) = u(8'(Z) x 8'*). 
Fork E {1, ... , K} and A E 8' 1, let Pk(A) be the probability under k of observing (r 1, ••• , r1) EC, 
where A = C x m-1• Pk is clearly calculable from knowledge of the density fk( · ). 
The measurable space of sample paths {fl, 8'(fl)} may now be endowed with the probability 
measure PTr which is the extension of P(D XA) =Ek E v'TTkPk(A), for De 8'(Z), A e 8'*. All 
almost-sure statements on sample paths w = (k, r1, r2 , ••• } are with respect to PTr. 
Step 3: Letting tf> denote the empty set, let @1 = u(8' 1 X {cf>, Z}) for each t, and let@*= v,oo_ 1@1• 
Then, the probability Pk placed by the principal on the parameter k e Z at time t can be written as 
Pk= E[J{kJx!l!* 1@ 1 ], where I denotes the indicator random variable. Since I.,;;; 1 a.s., it follows by 
Billingsley (1979, example 35.5, p. 410) that pfc is a martingale with respect to the sigma-filtration 
@1• An appeal to the Martingale Convergence Theorem (Billingsley (1979, p. 416)) now reveals the 
existence of a random variable P'k such that pfc converges to P'k a.s. 
Since Z is a finite set, and the preceding statements hold for each k, it now follows that there is a 
set F of sample paths with PTr(F) = 1, such that for each k, pfc converges to P'k on F. 
Finally, since linear functions of martingales are themselves martingales, we have that 
!(pf, .. ., pk)== l(p1) is also a (uniformly bounded) martingale, which converges a.s. to a limit 
random variable. Simple arguments show that this limit must be l(p'!,. .. , p';) == l(p00). 
Step 4: Recall the definition of c in Step 1. Define the (possibly extended-) integer-valued 
random variable T by 
T = min { t I l ( p 1) < c} 
if this is well-defined, and set T = oo, otherwise. It is easy to see that T is a stopping time, i.e., 
fr= t} e@: 1 for all t. Let the random variable l(p7 ) be defined by 
l(p7 )(w) = l( P7 (w)( W) ), 
=l(p00(w)), 
if T( w) is finite 
otherwise. 
Since l(p1) is uniformly bounded a.s., the conditions of Proposition A.1 (Step 0) are met. 
Therefore, E[l(p7 )] = E[/(p1)], and, of course, E[/(p1)] = c, since l('TT) = c. 
But this implies the existence of a set G with PTr(G) > 0 such that T = oo on G. For, the contrary 
would imply that T is finite almost surely, which in turn implies E[l(p7 )] < c, a contradiction. 
Step 5: Finally, observe that by the definition of PTr (see Step 2), there must exist a k* e Z, and 
A c !R* such that Pk*( A)> 0, for, otherwise, PTr(G) > 0 is not possible. But this just says that, 
conditional on its "true" type being k*, an arm will last forever with positive probability, if the 
rejection rule followed is that specified in Step 1, namely, if the arm is replaced by an untried arm at 
the first t at which its prior p 1 satisfies l(p 1) < l('TT) = c. By construction, however, M(p) < M('TT) = 
l(p) < c, and it now easily follows that under the rejection criterion specified by M( ·) also, an arm 
of type k* will last forever with positive probability; or in the notation of Section 5.2 that Uk* > 0. 
Q.E.D. 
18 This limit, of course, exists by the Martingale Convergence Theorem. 
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Ill.2: Proof of Theorem 5.2 
We begin with a definition. For p, p' E L1x- 1, say that p prior-dominates p' if, for all/ E {1, . . . , K}, 
it is the case that L~ _ 1 Pk ;;i.. L~ - i P/c 
CLAIM 1: For a, b E !R, {3(p, a) prior-dominates {3(p, b) whenever a> b. 
PROOF: Since {3/p, r) = Pd/r)/[Lf_ 1pJ/r)], we have to show that 
ktl Pdk(a) /jtl Pjfj(a) ;;i.. ktl Pdk(b) /jtl Pjfj(b), 
for all IE {1, . .. , K}. Cross-multiplying, and canceling common terms, this is the same as 
or, 
I K I K 
L L [PkPJk(a)fj(b)] ;;i.. L L [PkPJk(b)f1(a)] . 
k - 1 j-1+1 k-1 j-1+1 
But, for each ke{l, . .. ,/} and jE{/+1, .. . ,K}, fk(a)f/bhfk(b)f/a) by the MLRP. This 
establishes the claim. Q.E.D. 
CLAIM 2: f(p) stochastically dominates f(p') if p prior-dominates p'. 
PROOF: This is a straightforward consequence of the densities (f 1, • .. , fK) being ordered accord-
ing to stochastic dominance. Q.E.D. 
LEMMA Al: For any p eL1K-I, and a, b E !R, M[{3(p,a)];;i..M[{3(p,b)] if a >b. 
PROOF: Intuitively, this follows from the facts that (i) a > b implies {3(p, a) prior-dominates {3(p, 
b), and, therefore, (ii) f(f3(p, a)) stochastically dominates f(f3(p, b)). For expositional continuity, a 
formal proof is postponed to the end of this section. 
REMARK: Lemma Al is the critical step in the first part of the proof of Theorem 5.2. A slightly 
different proof of this lemma may be obtained by establishing that the conditions of Ross (1983, 
Ch. VII, Prop. 5.4) are satisfied. Since this Lemma is important to the overall proof (and is also, 
perhaps, of independent interest), we include the proof here so as to keep the exposition 
self-contained. 
CLAIM 3: For any p E L1x-i, there is a(p) E C/(!R) such that M[{3(p, r )] ;;i.. m* if! r ;;i.. a(p). 
PROOF: Immediate consequence of Lemma A 1. Q.E.D. 
CLAIM 4: For any p E .:ix-i, a[{3(p, a)].;; a[{3(p, b)] if a> b. 
PROOF: Follows from Lemma Al, and the definition of a( · ). Q.E.D. 
Now, fix p E L1x - 1. We introduce some new notation. First, for each t, and r' = (r 1, ... , r1 ) E !R 1, 
define B'(r') inductively as follows. Let B 1(r 1) = {3(p, r1), and for t ;;i.. 1, let B'(r') = 
{3[B 1 - 1(r 1 - 1), r,]. Further, let the functions k' be inductively defined as follows: k 0 = a(p), and for 
t ;;i.. 1, k'(r') = a[B1(r 1)]. Then, (i) B 1(r 1) is simply the posterior belief on the arm when the initial 
belief was p, and the rewards r' = (r1, ... , r,) were observed, and, (ii) k'(r') is the cut-off level in 
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period t + 1 for retaining the arm, given the initial prior p, and the rewards r' through period t. 
Iterating on the arguments used to prove Lemma A.1, it is simple to show the following claim. 
Cl.AIM 5: If r'(l), r 1(2) E !R', and r'(l);;. r 1(2), then k'(r'(l)).;; k'(r'(2)). 
Now fix t. We will show that Qk(t);;. Qt(t) whenever k <I. So fix such a k and /. Recall the 
definitions of FJ and @i' from Section 5. Using the notation introduced above, we can write @i' as 
{r' E!R'lr1 ;;.k, and rT;;.kT- 1(r1, ... ,rT_ 1) for r=2, ... ,t}. Note that 
Some further notation will greatly simplify the arguments to follow. Define: 
and, inductively, for r = 2, ... , t - l, 
Now define the functions g 1, ••• , g 1- 1 exactly as above, but with fk replaced by ft· In this notation, 
then, 
Qt(t) = r g 1(r)ft(r)dr. 
a(p) 
Finally, note that by Oaim 5, it is the case that for each r, h'-T(r1-T-1, r) and g 1-T(r 1-T- 1, r) are 
both nondecreasing in r. Summing up, we have 
=g'-1(r'-1), 
where the inequality follows from stochastic dominance. So, 
= g'-2(r'-2), 
where the first inequality obtains since h1- 1 ;;.g1-1, and the second since g 1- 1(r 1- 2, ·)is nonde-
creasing and fk stochastically dominates ft· The argument evidently iterates, and we obtain 
h10;;. g 10, and finally, therefore, Qk(t);;. Qt(t). Q.E.D. 
Finally, we tum to the proof of Lemma A.1. 
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Proof of Lemma A.I 
We have to show that for any p E LIK-1, and any a, b E !R such that a> b, we have M(f3(p, a));;;. 
M(f3(p, b )). This is the same as showing that, for any terminal reward of m E ~, we have 
V[f3(p, a); ml;;;. V[f3(p, b ); ml. So let m be given. We will use an induction proof ctJnstructed as 
follows. First, we will consider the stopping problem when the horizon is truncated to T periods, 
T = 0, 1, 2, .... (T = 0 corresponds to the case when there is no play at all.) Equivalently, this may be 
considered as altering the discount sequence to {1, 8, 82, ••• , 5r-1,0,0, ... }. Letting Vr( ·; m) denote 
the value of this problem, we will show that for all T, for any p E LI K - 1, and for all a, b E !R with 
a> b, we must have Vr[f3(p, a); ml;;;. Vr[f3(p, b); ml. An appeal to Theorem 2.5.1 of Berry and 
Fristedt (1985, p. 40) then shows that Vr(·;m)-->V(·;m) as T-->oo. Thus, V[f3(p,a);ml;;. 
V[ {3( p, b ); ml, whence the lemma follows. 
First, note that Vr[f3(p, a); ml;;;. Vr[f3(p, b); ml is true for T = 0, for any p E LIK-l, and a> b, 
since both expressions are 0. Suppose now that it holds for -r = 0, 1, ... , T, i.e., for all such -r, and for 
any p ELIK- 1, and any a,b E!R such that a >b, we have V,.[f3(p,a);ml;;;. V,.[f3(p,b);ml. Pick any 
pELIK- 1, and any a,bE!R with a>b. Let 7T=f3(p,a) and 7T'=f3(p,b). We will show that 
Vr+i<'Tl';m);;. Vr+1(7T';m). If the optimal choice in this stopping problem at the prior 71'1 picks the 
terminal reward m, then the inequality evidently holds, so suppose the optimal strategy picks the 
arm with prior 71'1• The value of this strategy is 
while it is also true that 
Suppressing dependence on m, it is therefore true that 
Vr+1(71')-Vr+ 1(71'');;;. {R(7T)-R(7T')} 
+8 J {Vr[/3(71',r)]f('T1')(r)-Vr[/3(71'',r)]f('T1'')(r)} dr 
= {R( 71') - R( 71'1 )} + 8 J Vr[/3( 71', r )]{f( 71' )(r) - f( 71'1 )(r)} dr 
+ 8 J {Vr[/3( 71', r )] - Vr[/3( 71'1r )]}f( 'Tl'')(r) dr. 
We will now argue that each of the three terms on the right-hand side is nonnegative, completing 
the induction step. The first term is obviously nonnegative since 71' prior-dominates 71'1, and we have 
stochastic dominance in the reward distributions. Now, Vr[/3(71', r)l is increasing in r by the 
induction hypothesis. Moreover, since 71' prior-dominates 71'1, f( 71') stochastically dominates f( 71'1 ) by 
Claim 2. So, the second term is also nonnegative. Pick any r E !R, and note that /3( 71', r) = 
f3({3(p, a), r) = f3({3(p, r ), a), while {3( 71'1, r) = f3({3(p, b), r) = f3({3(p, r ), b ). Thus, letting p = {3(p, r ), 
we have Vr[/3(71', r)l = Vrlf3(p, a)l, and Vr[/3(71'' r)l = Vr[f3(p, b)l. Since a> b, the induction hy-
pothesis implies that 
Vr[/3(71',r)] = Vr[f3(p,a)];;;. Vr[f3(p,b)] = Vr[/3(7T'r)]. 
This implies, of course, that the third term is also nonnegative, establishing Vr+ 1( 71'; m);;;. 
Vr+ 1(71''; m), which in turn proves the lemma. Q.E.D. 
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